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Food Price Heterogeneity and Income Inequality in




The paper uses data from the Second and the Third Integrated Household Sur-
veys to examine whether the poor pay more for food in Malawi, and the conse-
quences of the poverty penalty on inequality measurement. The results show that
regardless of location and year, poor households pay more for food compared to
nonpoor households. It is found that measured inequality based on a new consump-
tion aggregate is much higher than o¢ cial inequality gures. The paper also nds
that nominal inequality underestimates "real" inequality, with the underestimation
ranging from 3.9% to 7.1% for the Gini coe¢ cient, 8.4% to 16.2% for the Thiel L,
and 0.11% to 24.5% for the Thiel T. The paper therefore nds that o¢ cial inequal-
ity gures understate the inequality problem in Malawi. The high inequality levels
may partly explain the puzzle of high economic growth which has led to marginal
poverty reduction in Malawi as these high levels of inequality could be impeding
the poverty reducing e¤ect of economic growth.
Keywords: poverty penalty; inequality; Malawi
1 Introduction
A number of studies (e.g. Attanasio and Frayne, 2006; Beatty, 2010; Gibson and Kim,
2013) have found evidence that food prices maybe regressive in the sense that the poor
compared to the non-poor pay more for food. A number of reasons are given in the
literature for the existence of this poverty penalty (see e.g. Muller (2002) and Mendoza
(2011)). First, serving the poor may be more costly, either because they live in remote
areas with higher transport costs or because they live in informal environments, where
poor infrastructure and weak legal rights make it risky for retailers to set up and so
a price premium is charged to recoup these extra costs (Mendoza, 2011). Second, the
poor face greater liquidity constraints, as such they may buy food in small quantities or
at suboptimal periods, and therefore not enjoy quantity/bulk discounts, which in turn
leads to higher unit prices (Rao, 2000; Beatty, 2010). Additionally, in a developing
country context, liquidity constraints and a lack of proper postharvest storage facilities
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or a combination of both may force the poor to buy food at suboptimal periods. For
instance, World Bank (2007) nds that maize- a staple food in Malawi- is sold cheaply
immediately after harvest but bought expensively during the lean season. Third, the
poor may bear higher search costs which result into the poor paying more for food. The
higher search costs can be due to either the fact that anything earned or produced by
the poor goes towards satisfying basic needs and therefore search related activities have a
relatively higher opportunity cost or that they live in geographically disperse rural areas,
where transport infrastructure is less developed which in turn entails that searching is
more costly.
The existence of a poverty penalty in food purchases has implications on both equity
and e¢ ciency. The double dividend of increased e¢ ciency and equity (Muller, 2002)
arising from improved food market performance may be due to the fact that as the prices
paid by the poor converge to the prices paid by everyone else, real inequality would fall
while at the same time resources would be more e¢ ciently allocated (Gibson and Kim,
2013). Additionally, and of interest in this paper, a poverty penalty in food purchases has
implications on the measurement of income inequality. This is especially so in developing
countries because according the Engels Law, the poors food budget share is higher than
the nonpoors, and therefore the inequality augmenting e¤ect of regressive food prices may
even be more pronounced in a context where the majority are poor. With regressive food
prices, nominal income inequality may underestimate the extent of income inequality. For
instance, Rao (2000) nds that food prices are income dependent in India, and that after
adjustment for this e¤ect, the Gini coe¢ cient for real income is from 12% to 23% higher
than the Gini for nominal income. Additionally, a number of poverty and inequality
studies (e.g. Günther and Grimm (2007); Muller (2008)) nd evidence of substantial
gains in accuracy by deating income or consumption more precisely.
As noted by Muller (2008), deation of welfare using regional or national level price
indices in developing countries is the norm rather than the exception. However, the design
of policies against income inequality requires its accurate measurement. O¢ cial inequality
measures in Malawi deate consumption-an income proxy- by using regional consumer
price index (CPI) series. They therefore do not control for the fact that households
may face di¤erent food prices (see for example NSO (2012a)), and consequently may
potentially be underestimating income inequality, and hence be providing a misleading
picture of the extent of inequality in Malawi. To the best of my knowledge no study has
looked at the impact of accounting for income dependent food prices on income inequality
in Malawi. This paper therefore closes this gap in knowledge by focusing on two issues.
First, the paper seeks to establish whether or not the poor pay more food in Malawi.
Second, the paper investigates the consequences of the poverty penalty on the levels of
and trends in measured income inequality in Malawi. As is shown in Section 2, Malawi
has been experiencing high economic growth rates over the period 2004-2011. However,
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o¢ cial gures indicate that income inequality worsened over the same period.
By allowing for the possibility of a poverty penalty in food purchases, this paper, ex-
amines whether inequality was actually worse than o¢ cially estimated. This re-estimation
of income inequality may also shed some light on why despite impressive economic growth
gures poverty has only barely declined in Malawi. As has been shown in the poverty-
inequality-growth literature, increasing inequality may hamper the poverty reducing e¤ect
of economic growth. For instance, Ravallion (2001) nds that of those countries which
registered improvements in living standards in a sample of 50 developing countries, the
reduction in poverty is larger for those countries where inequality is falling. Besides,
if inequality is actually underestimated, it raises questions with respect to the poverty
reducing e¤ects of future growth. Fosu (2009) nds that the impact of income growth
on poverty reduction in a number of sub-Saharan African and non- Sub-Saharan African
countries is a decreasing function of initial inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at trends in
economic growth, poverty, and inequality in Malawi. A description of the data used in
the study is given in Section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology and variables used.
This is followed by the empirical results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Growth, Poverty, and Inequality in Malawi
The Malawian government has pursued poverty reduction e¤orts through various strate-
gies emphasizing economic growth, infrastructure development, and the provision of basic
social services. These strategies include the Poverty Alleviation Program (1994); the
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002-2005); and, more recently, the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy (MGDS) (2006-2011 and 2011-2016). Although, Malawi has
experienced a strong economic growth performance in the recent past, the impact of this
growth on poverty and income inequality has been mixed. Table 1 provides selected
economic indicators for Malawi over the period 2004 and 2011. The economy grew at
an average annual rate of 6.2% between 2004 and 2007, and surged further to an aver-
age growth of 7.5% between 2008 and 2011. Malawis economy is agrobased, with the
agricultural sector accounting for about 30% of GDP over the period 2004-2011. Over
the same period, the agriculture sector was by far Malawis most important contributor
to economic growth, with a contribution of 34.2% to overall GDP growth (NSO, 2012b).
Given that economic growth was primarily driven by growth in the agriculture sector, and
considering that about 90% of Malawians live in farm households (Benin et al. 2012), one
would expect that this impressive growth would lead to signicant reductions in poverty.
O¢ cial poverty statistics indicate that the high economic growth rates over this
ve year period, however, could only translate into marginal poverty reduction. O¢ -
cial poverty gures in Table 1 show that the percentage of poor people in Malawi was
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52.4% in 2004, and marginally declined to 50.7% in 2011. Interestingly, the high economic
growth rate had contrasting e¤ects on rural and urban poverty. For the period 2004-2011,
the poverty headcount in rural areas minimally increased from 55.9% to 56.6% while ur-
ban poverty declined from 25.4% to 17.3%. Ironically, this dismal poverty reduction
performance coincided with the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), which every year
provides low-cost fertilizer and improved maize seeds to poor smallholders who are mostly
rural based. Implementation of the FISP started in the 2005/6 cropping season, and in
the 2012/13 nancial year, the programme represented 4.6% of GDP or 11.5% of the total
national budget (World Bank, 2013).
In terms of inequality, o¢ cial gures suggest that the high economic growth rates did
not only fail to lead to substantial poverty reduction but also worsened income inequality.
Table 1 shows that nationally, the Gini coe¢ cient increased from 0.390 in 2004 to 0.452
in 2011. The magnitude of the disequalising e¤ect of growth varies with location. It was
more pronounced in rural areas which saw the Gini coe¢ cient increase from 0.339 in 2004
to 0.375 in 2011 while the urban Gini coe¢ cient rose from 0.484 to 0.491 over the same
period. The preceeding discussion shows that many people did not benet from the high
economic growth registered by Malawi; suggesting that growth was not inclusive. Further
to this, rural households compared to their urban counterparts were the most excluded
from the benets of the high economic growth.
The above economic growth and poverty story for Malawi represents a paradox in
the sense that if the economy was growing as o¢ cially estimated why did poverty not
decline signicantly? Four possible hypotheses can be put forward to explain this para-
dox. First, economic growth could have been completely disconnected from household
expenditures, suggesting that the additional income went completely into enterprises
benets, investments, taxes, and/or outside the country and/or accrued to rather few
agents not necessarily covered by the household surveys (Günther and Grimm, 2006). A
second explanation might be that the levels of economic growth were overestimated. This
reects a common phenomenon in many developing countries where data are unreliable.
A number of studies (e.g. Jayne et al., 2008; Dorward et al., 2008; Ricker-Gilbert et al.,
2011) have cast doubts over the accuracy of o¢ cial maize production statistics. They
all point to an overestimation of maize production data, which in turn could have led to
inated GDP gures.
A third possible explanation for this paradox could be that due to methodological
shortcomings, o¢ cial poverty gures underestimate the decline in poverty. A recent re-
examination of these poverty gures shows that the decrease in poverty was much larger
than o¢ cially estimated. Beck et al. (2014) estimate new regional poverty lines and
poverty rates for Malawi using a new consumption aggregate. Their approach relative
to the o¢ cial one is more robust as they use an entropy-based approach to ensure that
poverty lines are reective of consumption bundles that are utility-consistent across space
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and over time. Their results show a more substantial decline in poverty between 2004
and 2011 of 6.1 percentage points. Further to this, Beck et al. (2014) nd that these
results are consistent with improvements in several other non-monetary dimensions of
well-being. A fourth explanation for the paradox might be that income inequality could
be worse than o¢ cially estimated. If one considers that poverty, inequality, and growth
are interrelated (see for example Ravallion (2001)), high levels of inequality can impede
the poverty reducing e¤ect of economic growth. This paper focuses on this explanation
for the puzzle. Thus, although o¢ cial estimates show that inequality was worsening,
by allowing for income dependent food prices, the re-assessment of inequality made in
this paper provides useful insights into whether or not o¢ cial inequality statistics are
understating the inequality problem.
3 Data
The data used in the paper come from the Second and the Third Integrated Household
Surveys (IHS2 and IHS3) conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). The two
surveys are comparable overtime, and they are statistically designed to be representative
at both national, district, urban and rural levels. Both surveys used a stratied two-stage
sample design where all districts constitute the strata. Within each district, and for IHS2
and IHS3 respectively, the primary sampling units (PSUs) selected at the rst stage are
the census enumeration areas (EA) dened for the 1998 and 2008 Malawi Population
and Housing Censi. Sample EAs were selected within each district systematically with
probability proportional to size. In the second stage, a random systematic sampling was
used to select households from the household listing for each sample EA. The IHS2 was
done from March 2004 to March 2005, while the IHS3 was conducted from March 2010
to March 2011. The total number of households for IHS2 is 11280; 1440 (representing
12.8%) are urban households, and 9840 (representing 87.2%) are rural households. The
IHS3 collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233 (representing 18.2%)
are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural households.
Both surveys collected socio-economic and demographic information on households,
and individuals within the households. Additionally, the surveys recorded information on
food consumption at the household level using the last seven days as the recall period.
They collected data on 115 and 124 food items in 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively which
are organized in eleven categories: cereals, grains and cereals products; roots, tubers and
plantains; nuts and pulses; vegetables; meat, sh and animal products; fruits; cooked
food from vendors; milk and milk products; sugar, fats and oil; beverages; and spices and
miscellaneous. Quantity unit codes, ranging from standard units such as kilograms and
litres to non-standard units such as heaps, pails, plates, cups and basins are converted
into grams by using conversion factors. The quality of conversion factors is critical as it
5
can a¤ect the calculation of unit values for food items consumed by a household, which
in turn can a¤ect the computation of total household consumption expenditure i.e. the
welfare indicator. Verduzco-Gallo and Ecker (2014) nd that o¢ cial conversion factors
which come with the data have inconsistencies and errors, and they consequently develop
a new set of conversion factors to address these problems. Similar to Beck et al. (2014),
this paper uses the revised set of conversion factors to generate unit values and a new
annualized consumption aggregate for each household. Both the o¢ cial and the new
consumption aggregates have the same non-food component, but only di¤er in their food
component. Beck et al. (2014) provide a detailed comparative analysis of the two food
aggregates. In summary, the new conversion factors lead to signicant di¤erences in the
two food aggregates especially for IHS3; this in turn a¤ects the consumption aggregate.
The new consumption aggregate for IHS2 follows a very similar pattern to that of the
NSO, however, for IHS3, the new consumption aggregate is signicantly larger than the
o¢ cially supplied one.
Total quantity of food consumed in a household is the sum of purchased food, own
production, and gifts. Since this paper is concerned with the existence of a poverty
penalty in the food market and its impact on inequality, I focus on purchased food only,
and leave out food consumed from the other two sources. Table 2 shows the structure and
pattern of food consumption by source and location. Three things are noteworthy about
the gures in the table. First, as would be expected, food from the market constitutes the
largest share (about 83% for both survey years) of food consumed by urban households
while for rural households most of the food is from own production (about 54% and 51%
for IHS2 and IHS3 respectively). Second, the share of purchased food and food from own
production by urban households remained fairly stable over the two years, however, rural
households experienced a shift away from own production to purchased food. In IHS2,
the share of own production was about 54% but this went down to about 51%, at the
same time, the share of purchased food rose from about 34% in IHS2 to about 39% in
IHS3. This means that rural households are turning more to the market for their food
needs. Third, for both survey years and areas, food from gifts make up the smallest share
of total food consumed.
4 Methodology
4.1 Measurement of a Poverty Penalty
The paper focuses on the two years 2004/5 and 2010/11 for which comparable data
are available; each year is further disaggregated into rural and urban households. To
measure whether the poor pay more for food in Malawi, I consider a poverty penalty as
a form of consumption-related inequality in prices i.e. price inequality which is related to
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socioeconomic status, and compute concentration indices of price indices. Concentration
indices are commonly used in the health economics literature to measure socioeconomic
inequality in various health outcomes. It has been used, for example, to measure and
to compare the degree of socioeconomic-related inequality in malnutrition (Wagsta¤ et.
al., 2003), and in health subsidies (ODonnell et al., 2007). To test for the existence of
a poverty penalty, one can alternatively regress a household specic price index on per
capita consumption and other controls (see for example Muller (2002) and Beatty (2010)).
Per capita consumption is used here to capture the economic status of a household.
A key advantage of the concentration index approach over the regression approach
is that the magnitude of the poverty penalty can be compared conveniently across time
periods, and areas. I calculate concentration indices of a household level Laspeyres price
index. In constructing the price index, I use the budget of the average household as the
base. A detailed discussion of the Laspeyres price index can be found in for example
Deaton and Tarozzi (2004). Instead of generating an overall price index for each house-
hold, I follow Rao (2000), and calculate a food only price index for each household. This
is necessitated by the fact that the survey data for the two years under review do not
have price information on non-food items such as health, education, housing, transport,
durables, and clothing. This is obviously a disadvantage, however, food comprises about
60% of the budget for the two periods, which makes using a food price index defensi-
ble. The two surveys did not collect detailed food prices; I instead use unit values as
proxies for prices. Unit values are calculated as expenditure on a food item divided by
quantity purchased. A household specic Laspeyres price index for household i in area
































is a weighted mean price of a food item for area g.
The interpretation of the price index is as follows: values greater than one suggest
that a household paid more than average for its food basket, and values less than one
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imply that the household paid less than the average. Although information was collected
on 115 and 124 food items in 2004/5 and 2010/11 respectively, the calculation of the
household specic index is based on a restricted sample of food items consumed by more
than 20 households in an area. This ensures that the price index is not driven by food
items consumed by very few households. The restriction reduces the number of food items
covered to 96 in 2004/5, and 113 in 2010/11 respectively. These food items respectively
represent 99.4% and 99.6% of the average households budget in 2004/5 and 2010/11.
Although the cuto¤ of 20 households is arbitrary, alternative cuto¤s such as 10 and
15 were also tried, but the results remain qualitatively unchanged. A major di¤erence
between the price index developed in this paper, and the o¢ cial CPI series is that the
o¢ cial series comprise food and nonfood components while the new indices are based
on food only. The o¢ cial CPI for the two years 2004/5 and 2010/11 were constructed
using the same procedure. The CPI was developed using price data collected by National
Statistical O¢ ce (NSO) for February/March of each period, along with the national
basket weights for 42 food and non-food items: twenty-nine items representing food and
beverages and thirteen items accounting for non-food consumption.
The concentration index for the Laspeyres price index is expressed as (see e.g. van






ig ; Rig) (4)







is a weighted mean price, Ng the sample size of each area, wig is a sampling weight of
household i (with
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i=1wig = Ng), and Rig is a weighted relative fractional rank of the
ith household in the consumption distribution, with households ranked from the poorest









wig where w0 = 0 (6)
Rig, thus represents the weighted cumulative proportion of the population up to the
midpoint of each individual weight.
A concentration index varies between -1 and +1. Negative values indicate a dis-
proportionate concentration of high food prices among the poor i.e. the poor pay more
for food, while the opposite is true for positive values. When there is no inequality in
food prices paid by households, the concentration index is zero. The magnitude of the
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concentration index reects both the strength of the poverty penalty, and the degree of
variability in prices. As shown by Koolman and van Doorslaer (2004), one can also place
an intuitive interpretation on the values of the concentration index. They show that mul-
tiplying the value of the concentration index by 75 gives the percentage of the price index
that would need to be (linearly) redistributed from the poorer half to the richer half of
the population to achieve a distribution with an index value of zero i.e. where there is no
poverty penalty in food purchases. The presence of a poverty penalty can be statistically
checked by testing the null hypothesis H0 : Cg = 0 against the alternative Ha : Cg < 0.
Since the Laspeyres price index is household specic, there is no guarantee that
food items consumed by one household will exactly be the same as those consumed by
another. This lack of overlap can bias our results given that for poorer households some
food items are too expensive for them to purchase. However, as noted by Rao (2000),
due to liquidity constraints, if they had purchased these items it is likely that they did
not benet from quantity discounting because they would have purchased them in smaller
quantities. Hence, this lack of overlap can in all likelihood only lead to an underestimation
of the poverty penalty rather than a reversal of the general conclusions of this paper.
4.2 Measurement of Inequality
O¢ cial inequality measurement in Malawi uses the Gini coe¢ cient, and generalized en-
tropy class of inequality indices (see for example NSO (2012a)). In order to be consistent
with o¢ cial statistics, and to ensure comparability, I use these two measures of inequality.












wigyig is the weighted mean of a per capita consumption expenditure
yig for area g; and cov(:) is a covariance, R0ig denotes the fractional rank of household i
(i.e. ranked by yig). The value of the Gini coe¢ cient ranges between 0 and 1, with 0
implying perfect equality, and 1 denoting perfect inequality.
The generalized entropy class of inequality indices, GE()g are dened as follows
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Where; 0g and Ng are as dened before. The values of GE vary between 0 and 8,
with zero representing an equal distribution and higher values representing a higher level
of inequality. The parameter  represents the weight given to distances between yig at
di¤erent parts of the yig distribution, and can take any real value. For lower values of
 , GE is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution of the welfare
indicator, and for higher values GE is more sensitive to changes that a¤ect the upper tail.
If  = 0, GE( = 0) gives the Theils L inequality index also known as the mean log
deviation measure (MLD); if  = 1; GE( = 1) gives the Theils T inequality index.
In order to capture the di¤erent levels of precision with respect to deation and their
impact on measured inequality, three per capita consumption expenditure variables are
used namely; nominal per capita consumption expenditure, real per capita consumption
expenditure with the o¢ cial CPI series as deators, and nally, real per capita consump-
tion expenditure with the new household specic price indices used as deators, and this
case only the food component is deated. I also use the o¢ cial nominal and real (de-
ated by o¢ cial CPI series) per capita expenditure. This essentially replicates o¢ cial
inequality estimates, and allows for a comparison of the results based on the new and the
o¢ cial consumption aggregates.
5 Results
Before turning to the results of the possible existence of a poverty penalty in food pur-
chases in Malawi and its impact on measured inequality, I rst discuss summary statistics
of the di¤erent price indices and the annualized nominal and real consumption expendi-
ture aggregates. The results for this analysis are reported in Table 3. For both survey
years and areas, the results indicate that the household-specic price indices are higher
than the o¢ cial ones; suggesting that o¢ cial CPI gures underestimate ination. As
would be expected, urban areas have higher ination than rural areas. The results also
show that the new nominal consumption aggregates are higher than the o¢ cial ones. This
means that the adoption of the more consistent conversion factors leads to nonnegligible
changes in the indicators of welfare.
A comparison of the o¢ cial nominal and real consumption aggregate shows that
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the impact of using the o¢ cial deator di¤ers for IHS2 and IHS3. For IHS2, and at
the national level, nominal consumption in Malawi Kwacha (MK) declines slightly after
deation from MK25104.62 to MK25040.68; a decline of about 0.3%. Perhaps reecting
the fact that prices are lower in rural areas, nominal consumption for rural areas is 3.4%
higher than real consumption. The reverse holds for urban areas as deation leads to a
10.7% drop in nominal consumption. For IHS3, a more consistent pattern is observed,
here real consumption at the national level and for rural and urban areas, is higher than
nominal consumption. The results also show that the increase consumption after adjusting
for purchasing power is more pronounced in rural areas.
Turning to the new consumption aggregate, the results indicate that when the o¢ cial
deator is used to deate the new consumption aggregate, the pattern observed earlier
for the o¢ cial aggregate generally persists. That it is, at the national level, nominal
consumption relative to real consumption is higher for IHS2 but lower for IHS3. In
contrast, when the household specic price index is used to deate the new consumption
aggregate, the results show that deation leads to lower real consumption for all periods
and all areas. For instance, nationally, real consumption is about 18.2% and 24.5% lower
than nominal consumption for IHS2 and IHS3 respectively. These results thus suggest
that allowing for the fact households face di¤erent prices for food, leads to substantial
reductions in nominal consumption. This in turn means that using the o¢ cial price
deator leads to a misleading picture of household welfare as it shows that household
welfare is better than it really is. Given these results, a more pertinent question is: does
this decline in the welfare indicator as a result of deation vary with household economic
status? Put di¤erently, do the poor pay more for food or face a poverty penalty in the
food market? I answer this question next.
5.1 Poverty penalty
The existence of regressive food prices would mean that deation of consumption as
a welfare indicator is skewed against poor households. Table 4 reports concentration
indices of the household specic Laspeyres price index for IHS2 and IHS3 disaggregated
by location. I use the concentration indices to assess whether or not poor households face
a poverty penalty when they purchase food. Negative values indicate a concentration of
high food prices among poor households, and hence poor households pay more for food.
The magnitude of the concentration indices reect the strength of the poverty penalty.
The table also include test results of the hypothesis that a concentration index is negative.
Concentration indices for all the survey periods, and areas are negative, and the
null that a concentration index is zero is rejected in a favour of the alternative that
it is negative. This means that regardless of location, poor households pay more for
food compared to nonpoor households. The concentration indices are smaller (i.e. more
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negative) for rural households than for urban households; suggesting that the poverty
penalty is more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas. The rural-urban di¤erence
in the poverty penalty for IHS2 is -.024, and this di¤erence is statistically signicant with
a z-statistic (p-value) of -5.7 (0.00). Similarly, for IHS3, the di¤erence is -0.062, and it
is statistically signicant with a z-statistic (p-value) of -7.7 (0.00). Further to this, the
results show that the poverty penalty was declining overtime as it was worse for IHS2 than
for IHS3. For instance, at the national level, the di¤erence in the concentration indices
between two years is -0.017 and this di¤erence is statistically signicant with a z-statistic
(p-value) of -5.8 (0.00).
As pointed out earlier, rescaling a concentration index by 75 gives a more intuitive
interpretation of a concentration index which is the percentage of the price index that
would need to be (linearly) redistributed from the poorer half to the richer half of the
population to have a situation where neither the poor nor the nonpoor pay more for food.
It is evident from the results that for IHS2, if about 2.1% of the price paid the poorer
half of the Malawian population was redistributed to the richer half of the population
then there would be no poverty penalty in food purchases. The corresponding gure for
IHS3 is about 0.8%; suggesting that the need for a redistribution scheme which favours
the poor has been declining overtime. The results also indicate for the two years under
study, the redistribution is more needed in rural areas than in urban areas. Redistribution
can be achieved through deliberate government interventions which seek to ensure that
the poorer half of the population would be paying less for food through for example
improving the poor infrastructure and weak legal rights associated with where the poor
live that make it risky for retailers to set up or a relaxation of liquidity constraints faced
by the poor, or a minimization of postharvest losses through the provision of reliable and
a¤ordable storage facilities.
5.2 Inequality
I now turn to a discussion of the impact of the poverty penalty on the measurement of
levels and trends in measured consumption inequality in Malawi. In order to get a sense
of how the distribution of consumption is a¤ected by the presence of the poverty penalty,
I rst look at percentile-specic average consumption by location and year. The results
are shown in Table 5. The results also include the percentage change in consumption
following deation for each percentile. A comparison of the o¢ cial and new nominal
consumption aggregates across the percentiles reveals that there is only a small di¤erence
at the lower end of the consumption distribution but the di¤erence is more evident at the
upper end of the distribution. This implies that using the revised conversion factors leads
to a much improved measurement of consumption especially for the richest households.
The pattern of the impact of deation across the di¤erent percentiles of consumption
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depends of the deator employed. When the o¢ cial deator is used on both the o¢ cial
and new consumption aggregate, real consumption is larger than nominal consumption in
the rst percentile, but this di¤erence progressively declines (and is some cases reversed)
as one moves up to the 99th percentile. This means that using the o¢ cial deator leads
to the conclusion that deation changes the distribution of consumption in favour of the
poor.
A reverse pattern is noticed when the household-specic deator is used. Although,
deation leads to decreasing consumption for all years and locations, the decline is more
substantial for the poorest households. For example, for IHS2, deation leads to a 27.8%
drop in consumption for households in the rst percentile, and the corresponding change
for IHS3 is 28.2%. Turning to the 99th percentile, the results show that deation reduces
nominal consumption by 8.9% and 18.7% for IHS2 and IHS3 respectively. Thus, the tails
of the consumption distribution are di¤erentially impacted by deation with the poorest
households experiencing larger declines in their consumption. This implies that when
one allows for the fact that households face di¤erent food prices, there is a shift in the
distribution of consumption to the disadvantage of the poorest households. This is simply
a reection of the earlier nding that the there is a poverty penalty when it comes to food
purchases in Malawi. These observed di¤erences in how the o¢ cial and the new deation
shift the distribution of consumption suggest that measured inequality is worse under the
new deation scheme.
I now turn to results of the exact consequences of deation on measured consumption
inequality. O¢ cial inequality measures are reproduced in Table 6. The table also contains
inequality measures based on nominal consumption. This helps to ascertain the e¤ect of
the o¢ cial deator on the measurement of consumption inequality. It is evident from
the Gini coe¢ cient, Thiel L, and the Thiel T results that the gures before and after
deation di¤er only marginally. For instance, at the national, the Gini coe¢ cient for
IHS2 before deation is 0.3988 and after deation it is 0.3900. For IHS3, the before and
after deation Gini coe¢ cients are 0.4592 and 0.4498 respectively. These di¤erences are
economically insignicant, and they are also statistically insignicant with a z-statistics
(p-values) of 0.4 (0.33) and 0.5 (0.32) for IHS2 and IHS3 respectively. This means that
the o¢ cial "real" inequality gures are no di¤erent from nominal inequality gures.
I now look at the inequality results for the new consumption aggregate presented
in Table 7. The results for all the three inequality measures indicate that the o¢ cial
deator does not really matter when it comes to inequality measurement as there are
only marginal di¤erences between inequality based on nominal consumption and real
consumption. What is also clear from the results is that measured inequality based on
the new consumption aggregate is much higher than that based on the o¢ cial consumption
aggregate. For instance, at the national level, nominal inequality as measured by the Gini
coe¢ cient is underestimated by 10.4% for IHS2, and by 5.7% for IHS3. Additionally, the
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underestimation is more evident for rural areas than for urban areas; it is 18.4% for IHS2
and 11.8% for IHS3. These higher inequality results are consistent with the earlier nding
that the adoption of the new conversion factors in generating the consumption aggregates
leads to much larger consumption levels for households at the top end of the consumption
distribution. The trends in the inequality results also show that inequality was worsening
over the two year period; and this is consistent with trends from the o¢ cial gures.
When the household-specic price deator is used on the new consumption aggregate,
the inequality results point to evidence that nominal inequality signicantly underesti-
mates "real" inequality. The extent of the underestimation ranges from 3.9% to 7.1%
for the Gini coe¢ cient, 8.4% to 16.2% for the Thiel L, and 0.11% to 24.5% for the Thiel
T. This means that the poverty penalty as expected leads to a quantitatively substantial
understating of inequality in Malawi. Hence, o¢ cial inequality statistics grossly under-
state the inequality problem. And as noted earlier, this may partly explain the puzzle of
how economic growth which is associated with minimal poverty reduction in Malawi as
these high levels of inequality could be impeding the poverty reducing e¤ect of economic
growth. The high inequality can also have serious implications on the long term e¤ective-
ness of future poverty reduction strategies since as found by Fosu (2009) the impact of
income growth on poverty reduction is a decreasing function of initial inequality.
5.3 Robustness checks
The above results are based on unit values as proxies for food prices. Since the food
products are clearly heterogeneous, the household specic price index can be contaminated
by quality e¤ects to the extent that quality is income/consumption expenditure-dependent
(Gibson and Kim, 2013). Quality e¤ects might occur if higher observed unit values are
not reective of higher prices but rather the purchase of goods of higher quality (Attanasio
and Frayne, 2006). Would the conclusions from the above results be robust to controlling
for quality e¤ects? To check the robustness of the results, I rst net out quality from the
unit values, and recalculate the household specic Laspeyres price index (equation(1)).
I follow Deaton (1988, 1997), and assume that the unit values ig for a food product
purchased by a household can be decomposed as follows
ln ig = ln p
0
ig + lnmig (9)
where mig is a measure of quality. The absence of quality e¤ects (i.e. mig = 1) implies
that unit values are equal to prices, p0ig. According to Deaton (1988, 1997), the demand
for quality depends on the log of total household consumption expenditure xig; and a
vector of quality demand shifters W qig as follows
lnmig = 
0W qig +  lnxig + "ig (10)
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where  is a vector of parameters for the quality demand shifters,  is an expenditure




is a well behaved error term. I use sex, age, and
schooling of the household head as quality of demand shifters. Substituting the quality
equation (10) into the unit value identity (equation (9)) gives
ln ig = 
0W qig +  lnxig +  ig (11)








captures the unit value com-
ponent which is not explained by quality. I therefore estimate equation (11), and then
use the residuals !^ig as a proxy for prices. Inequality measures based on these new unit
values are presented in Table 8.
Similar to the previous results, the new results show that all the concentration indices
are negative; which suggests that purging quality e¤ects does not change the conclusion
that regardless of location and survey period, poor households pay more for food in
Malawi. Further to this, a look at the new concentration indices, reveals that they are
marginally higher (i.e. more negative) than the old ones. More specically, the national
pre and post quality adjusted concentration indices for IHS2 are -0.0276 and -0.0279
respectively, while for IHS3 they are -0.0104 and -0.0111 respectively. However, these
national level di¤erences are quantitatively insubstantial, and statistically insignicant;
the z-statistics (p-values) of the di¤erences are 0.1 (0.54) and 0.3 (0.38) for IHS2 and
IHS3 respectively. Thus, these results imply that the poverty penalty in the food market
is no worse when quality is taken into account than when it is ignored.
A comparison with the previous results also indicates that controlling for quality
does not qualitatively alter the earlier conclusions that inequality is still underestimated
by o¢ cial inequality gures. It can also be observed that for rural and urban areas, netting
out quality e¤ects leads to higher values of the Gini coe¢ cient, Thiel L, and the Thiel T
for IHS2 and IHS3. For instance, before and after adjusting for quality, the national Gini
coe¢ cients for IHS2 are 0.4654 and 0.473 respectively, while the national Gini coe¢ cients
for IHS3 are 0.5139 and 0.5164 respectively. These di¤erences are not only economically
insignicant, but they are also statistically insignicant with the z-statistics (p-values) of
the di¤erences given as -0.3(0.40) and -0.1 (0.46) for IHS2 and IHS3 respectively. What
all this means is that the conclusion that o¢ cial inequality gures understate the extent
of inequality nationally and for rural and urban areas, is insensitive to whether quality is
accounted for or not.
6 Concluding Comments
The paper has used data from the Second and the Third Integrated Household Surveys
(IHS2 and IHS3) to examine two things namely; whether the poor pay more for food in
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Malawi, and the consequences of the poverty penalty on inequality measurement. A new
set of conversion factors which removes inconsistencies and errors is used to generate unit
values which are then used to generate a new annualized consumption aggregate for each
household. The results show that regardless of location and year, poor households pay
more for food compared to nonpoor households. The Gini coe¢ cient, the Thiel L, and
the Thiel T are used to assess the impact of the poverty penalty on measured inequality.
It is found that measured inequality based on the new consumption aggregate is much
higher than o¢ cial inequality gures.
The paper has also found that nominal inequality underestimates "real" inequality,
with the underestimation ranging from 3.9% to 7.1% for the Gini coe¢ cient, 8.4% to
16.2% for the Thiel L, and 0.11% to 24.5% for the Thiel T. The paper therefore nds that
o¢ cial inequality gures understate the inequality problem in Malawi. These conclusions
are found to be robust to purging the unit values of quality e¤ects. The high inequality
levels may partly explain the puzzle of high economic growth which has led to marginal
poverty reduction in Malawi as these high levels of inequality could be impeding the
poverty reducing e¤ect of economic growth.
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Table 1: Trends and levels of economic growth, poverty, and inequality, 2005-2011
Area 2005 2011









a Average GDP growth for 2004-2007, b average GDP growth for 2008-2011.
Source: NSO (2005, 2012a, 2012b)
Table 2: Percentage share of food consumed by source
Food Source IHS2 IHS3National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Purchased 40.0 34.1 82.9 45.6 38.7 83.0
Own 49.3 54.3 12.7 44.6 50.7 11.8
Gifts 10.7 11.6 4.4 9.8 10.6 5.2
Observations 11280 9840 1440 12271 10038 2233
Source: Author’s estimation using IHS2 and IHS3
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Table 3: Means of price indices and consumption expenditure
Variable IHS2 IHS3
National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Price indices
Official 0.99 0.98 1.13 0.93 0.92 1.00
New 1.83 1.82 1.94 1.89 1.87 1.99
Official per capita expenditure
Nominal 25104.62 21034.76 55065.75 59695.75 45378.70 137128.55
Real 25040.68 21759.39 49196.68 63301.07 49630.29 137238.58
Change (%) -0.25 3.44 -10.66 6.04 9.37 0.08
New per capita expenditure
Nominal 27928.21 23967.25 57087.69 69239.44 54667.51 148050.77
Real (official index) 27925.32 24783.16 51057.08 73601.07 59845.38 147997.78
Change (%) -0.01 3.40 -10.56 6.30 9.47 -0.04
Real (new index) 22846.84 19691.45 45860.07 52281.67 41161.08 112004.15
Change (%) -18.19 -17.84 -19.67 -24.49 -24.71 -24.35
Observations 11280 9840 1440 12271 10038 2233
Note: The new index refers to the household-specific Laspeyres price index; new expenditure refers to the
new consumption aggregate which is based on revised conversion factors. Change (%) captures the
percentage change in consumption following deflation.
Table 4: Concentration indices of the household specic Laspeyres index
Price Index IHS2 IHS3National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Laspeyres -0.0276*** -0.034*** -0.0098*** -0.0104*** -0.0166*** -0.0004***
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0001)
[-2.07] [-2.55] [-0.74] [-0.78] [-1.25] [-0.03]
Notes: The hypothesis that a concentration index is negative is tested. This amounts to testing for
evidence that the poor pay more for food i.e. there is a poverty penalty in the food market. In parenthesis
are standard errors. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%. In square brackets are the percentage
of the price index that would need to be (linearly) redistributed from the poorer half to the richer half of the
population to achieve a distribution where there is no poverty penalty in food purchases.
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Table 5: Percentile-specic average consumption
Variable Percentiles
1% 5% 50% 95% 99%
IHS2
Official per capita expenditure
Nominal 4998.8 6879.4 17509.6 61813.5 153485.9
Real 5109.9 7006.502 17934.94 61517.5 143998.7
Change (%) 2.22 1.85 2.43 -0.48 -6.18
New per capita expenditure
Nominal 4884.1 6939.3 18201.4 68455.9 177335.3
Real (official index) 4950.4 6985.9 18487.6 68023.3 171124.5
Change (%) 1.36 0.67 1.57 -0.63 -3.50
Real (new index) 3524.9 5047.2 13563.8 55222.8 161473.5
Change (%) -27.83 -27.27 -25.48 -19.33 -8.94
IHS3
Official per capita expenditure
Nominal 8256.0 12657.8 38424.4 166314.7 404382.0
Real 9018.3 13555.3 41420.8 172744.5 414515.0
Change (%) 9.23 7.09 7.80 3.87 2.51
New per capita expenditure
Nominal 8689.4 13157.7 42816.9 193304.8 494216.8
Real (official index) 9447.9 14331.8 46465.9 199778.6 507410.7
Change (%) 8.73 8.92 8.52 3.35 2.67
Real (new index) 6237.8 9302.4 29733.1 151011.7 402042.4
Change (%) -28.21 -29.30 -30.56 -21.88 -18.65
Note: The new index refers to the household-specific Laspeyres price index; new expenditure refers
to the new consumption aggregate which is based on revised conversion factors. Change (%) captures
the percentage change in consumption following deflation.
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Table 6: Inequality measures using the o¢ cial consumption aggregate
Per capita consumption IHS2 IHS3National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Gini coefficient
Nominal 0.3988 0.3341 0.4785 0.4592 0.3727 0.4905
(0.0151) (0.0048) (0.0264) (0.0145) (0.0068) (0.0011)
Real 0.3900 0.3392 0.4839 0.4498 0.3747 0.4884
(0.0140) (0.0049) (0.0279) (0.0135) (0.0066) (0.0027)
Theil's L
Nominal 0.2638 0.1823 0.3811 0.356 0.2314 0.4095
(0.0208) (0.0054) (0.0448) (0.0237) (0.0085) (0.0015)
Real 0.2518 0.1879 0.3911 0.3411 0.2339 0.4061
(0.0187) (0.0056) (0.0480) (0.0214) (0.0084) (0.0019)
Theil's T
Nominal 0.3302 0.1996 0.4314 0.4455 0.2512 0.4719
(0.0344) (0.0070) (0.0408) (0.0456) (0.0120) (0.0010)
Real 0.3073 0.2049 0.4430 0.4196 0.2535 0.4646
(0.0304) (0.0073) (0.0441) (0.0402) (0.0117) (0.0015)
Notes: Nominal is the annualised official per capita nominal consumption aggregate, Real is the annualised
official per capita real consumption aggregate with official CPI series used as deflators. In parenthesis are
standard errors.
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Table 7: Inequality measures using the new consumption aggregate
Price Index used IHS2 IHS3National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Gini coefficient
None 0.4403 0.3957 0.4894 0.4852 0.4166 0.5233
(0.0216) (0.0244) (0.0274) (0.018) (0.0151) (0.0216)
Official CPI 0.434 0.400 0.4952 0.4776 0.4189 0.5208
(0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0288) (0.0173) (0.0156) (0.0215)
Laspeyres 0.4654 0.4182 0.5239 0.5139 0.4464 0.5438
(0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0253) (0.0163) (0.0133) (0.0027)
Theil's L
None 0.328 0.2675 0.3995 0.4035 0.2952 0.4734
(0.0348) (0.0381) (0.0481) (0.0321) (0.0229) (0.0211)
Official CPI 0.3189 0.2731 0.4103 0.3907 0.2987 0.4688
(0.0345) (0.038) (0.0515) (0.0302) (0.0238) (0.0270)
Laspeyres 0.3671 0.2986 0.4643 0.4527 0.3394 0.5131
(0.0324) (0.0323) (0.051) (0.0308) (0.0215) (0.0114)
Theil's T
None 0.4785 0.4145 0.4539 0.5566 0.3709 0.6401
(0.0889) (0.1183) (0.0428) (0.0824) (0.0521) (0.0211)
Official CPI 0.4623 0.4165 0.4666 0.5327 0.3769 0.6278
(0.0913) (0.1174) (0.0462) (0.0762) (0.0554) (0.0232)
Laspeyres 0.573 0.5084 0.5269 0.6279 0.4651 0.6408
(0.0989) (0.1308) (0.0412) (0.0642) (0.0483) (0.0303)
Notes: In parenthesis are standard errors.
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Table 8: Inequality measures with quality e¤ects netted out
Price Index used IHS2 IHS3National Rural Urban National Rural Urban
Concentration index
Laspeyres -0.0279 -0.0352 -0.0155 -0.0111 -0.0167 -0.0005
(0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0001)
Gini coefficient
Laspeyres 0.473 0.4297 0.5218 0.5164 0.4488 0.5441
(0.022) (0.025) (0.0269) (0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0113)
Theil's L
Laspeyres 0.3813 0.3181 0.4603 0.4583 0.3445 0.5137
(0.0384) (0.0420) (0.0533) (0.0329) (0.0278) (0.0422)
Theil's T
Laspeyres 0.6303 0.5882 0.5254 0.6436 0.4859 0.6414
(0.1302) (0.1738) (0.0441) (0.0712) (0.0729) (0.0413)
Notes: The Laspeyres index is based on unit values where quality effects have been purged. In parenthesis
are standard errors.
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